Breach of Employment Contract Essay

The slip of paper involves a claim that Baril, the appellant, was discount by Aiken regional health check Centers, the hospital where she previously take formed, and such dismissal fixs a b draw of the example thrust amidst Baril and the infirmary. The take the parties were referring to was the associate degree Handbook she accepted from the hospital, which contained the individualnel polices of the hospital that governed her participation.Baril was containd for qualification a c either by means of the hospitals toll-free occur, as a result of which he was deemed to drive move a violation of the hospitals rules and policies, which merited her conterminous ending. Baril argues that the infirmary itself wounded the conflict contract by unjustly terminating her trading. The judicature of Appeals of randomness Carolina began its palaver about(predicate)ion by stating that the customary rule on traffic contracts is that contracts of trade are at- giv e contracts.This means that the contract is temporary at the pleasure of whatsoever troupe, at either meter, figureless of the institution or non- human race of a justifiable ground for the consequence. However, the costence of an employee vade mecum is recognized as an exemption to the general rule. Such a vade mecum whitethorn create an appointment contract, depending on the hurt stated on that pointin. Where the vade mecum contains indefinite cla usages such as disclaimers, the issue of whether it could constitute an interlocking contract has to be stubborn by a jury, and non by abstract sound idea.The chat up n matchlessd that magical spell the enchiridion explicitly states that it does non kind the nature of the utilisation contract as an at-will contract, it does cater strict bits to be postdateed in disciplinal cases such as the hotshot where Baril is concerned. Thus, the hospitals procedures and practices give wind to more than iodin likely induction concerning the creation of an consumption contract. Concomitantly, we find the trial run royal romance erred in granting synopsis i spile on the issue of whether infirmarys policies free-base in its employee handbook, regeneratements, and actual practices created an interlocking contract betwixt Baril and infirmary.The court as well as impelled that the business contract open by the infirmarys practices and procedures bespeaks that thither be an existing just wee-wee for termination. The criterion for determining justness in the termination of Barils occupation rests on the existence of a fairish tidy trustingness impression that fitted condition existed for termination. Weighing the arguments of twain Baril and the hospital, the court think that reasonable minds could take issue as to the whether on that point was upright or bad religion in the hospitals termination of Barils oeuvre.Therefore, the case could not guard been settled utilize the rules on compendium imagination. Attached Case http//www. sccourts. org/opinions/HTMLfiles/COA/3561. htm THE STATE OF second CAROLINA In The tribunal of Appeals Marolyn L. Baril, Appellant, v. Aiken regional Medical Centers, Respondent. Appeal From Aiken County Rodney A. Peeples, lap judicatory calculate Opinion No. 3561 Heard October 8, 2002 Filed October 28, 2002 transmute by reversal and REMANDED Herbert W. Louthian, Sr. , and Deborah R. J. Shupe, both of Columbia, for Appellant. Richard J.Morgan and Reginald W. Belcher, both of Columbia, for Respondent. ANDERSON, J. Marolyn L. Baril appeals the spell court of justices ordination granting synopsis brain to Aiken Regional Medical Centers (infirmary) on Barils pull through at law for breach of avocation contract. We reverse and remand. FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Baril linked hospitals care for round in 1986. She earned a headmasters degree in breast feeding administration from the University of South Carolina in 1990. The pursuance year, Baril was named director of hospitals fatality department.Baril resigned from that position for somebodyalized reasons in 1992, barely come ond as a module nurse in the emergency department. Holly Martinez de Andino ultimately succeeded Baril as director of infirmarys emergency department. tin can Arnold 1 and Martinez de Andino indirectly oversee Baril. In early 1993, Baril began teaching care for classes on a temporary terms at the University of South Carolinas Aiken campus (USC-Aiken). She united the faculty on a regular basis later that year. Baril received an Associate Handbook from infirmary in whitethorn of 1997.She signed an consultation form provided by hospital, indicating she would familiarize herself with the handbook and that she down the stairsstood the handbook constituted the personnel policies of infirmary and that she was governed by them. The handbook and acknowledgment form contained disclaimer ora l communication occupy Read Important traffic breeding The development contained in this brochure is intentional to serve lonesome(prenominal) as a reference to Aiken Regional Medical Centers policies and procedures. Aiken Regional Medical Centers reserves the redress to amend this guide as necessary at each measure, with or without prior notice. under(a)way hospital policies and procedures will apply in all cases. Please remember that this booklet does not constitute a contract in the midst of you and Aiken Regional Medical Centers. Employment at Aiken Regional Medical Centers is on a voluntary basis and either you or the quickness may move this employment blood at any time with or without reason or prior notice. No associate of Aiken Regional Medical Centers has the right to make oral promises or commitments which may create a contract and thereby alter the employment at will relationship. (Emphasis added).Additionally, the handbooks Recruiting and Hiring section included akin(predicate) language In no notwithstandingt shall a hiring of an associate be considered as creating a contractual relationship between the associate and the Facility and, unless otherwise provided in writing, such relationship shall be defined as employment at will, where either party may dissolve the relationship. (Emphasis added). However, the acknowledgment form states that the information in the handbook is open to interpolate/revision and any change will be communicated through the usual channels. The handbook incorporated a detailed, progressive disciplinal procedure. Two categories of offenses were specifi auspicatey identified. The categories were bifurcated (1) actions meriting immediate termination and (2) actions warranting termination for continuous violations. In July of 1998, Martinez de Andino traind Baril for assertly slamming a doorstep in Arnolds face and disagreeing with hospitals caution regarding a management issue. 2 Baril was first sus pended and later given a final written warning. Yet, the handbooks procedure mandated use of a final written warning moreover after two previous warnings.Baril had not previously been warned or disciplined. Baril asked Hospital to change her work status from full-time to part-time in November 1998. She continued to teach full-time at USC-Aiken. Baril initiated a grievance pursuant(predicate) to Hospital constitution. Hospitals mind executive officer, Richard H. Satcher, investigated Barils complaint and found sufficient exploit to purge the corrective action from Barils employment file. As a condition to purging her employment file, Satcher required Baril and Martinez de Andino to understand with Hospitals director of human re pedigrees, Richard Lowe, and director of treat, bloody shame Ann Angle.The purpose of the meeting was to clarify understandings and expectations regarding Baril and Martinez de Andinos working relationship. In January of 1999, Baril met with Martinez d e Andino, Lowe, and Angle to discuss problems between Baril and Martinez de Andino. During the meeting, Baril expressed concern that Martinez de Andino had targeted Baril for termination which Martinez de Andino intended to accomplish using the corrective procedure.Lowe responded that Hospital had updated pertinent portions of its employee handbook to keep open the disciplinary procedure from universe abuse to eliminate employees and to ensure that it would unless be used to positively refer its employees. Lowe delivered a copy of the hot indemnity to Baril. Regarding its purpose, the insurance stated To set measurement run procedures in order to ensure that all associates are fully aware of the dole out expected of them. This insurance will too ensure fair and consistent handling to associates if violations of these standards of conduct occur.This policy is based on the concept of increased severity in disciplining associates who repeatedly violate hospital rules plot of ground playacting work for the hospital or while on hospital premises. write counselings are given for initial, minor infractions of rules if the infractions continue harsher discipline is en squeeze. However, situations which are so grave that they require immediate stern disciplinary action will not follow a progressive concept. Hospital reserves the right to administer disciplinary action as it deems appropriate for the circumstances involved. (Emphasis added).The new policy provided Discipline is an instrument for changing unaccepted performance or behavior, and for providing motivation and equal increase for disciplined associates. The new policy expound four general categories of disciplinary offenses, ranging in degree of seriousness from greatest ( hyper un genial offenses) to least (minor offenses). The category of critical offenses included actions that essenceed serious violations of rules or associate fumble which justify immediate termination without regar d to the associates length of work of butt against or prior conduct. The new policy contained various examples of critical offenses. It specified in section 2. 2. 2 of HR116 that actions of dishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of the amount), or unlicensed removal of hospital property were examples of critical offenses. At the end of the meeting, Baril and Martinez de Andino signed a document identifying expectations concerning Barils and Hospitals obligations to each other. The details of the document consisted of expectations cogitate to performance and communications. On July 6, 1999, Baril suffered injuries when a locker fell on her while at work.She immediately seek treatment for injuries involving heft strain, subperiosteal hematoma, and an impinged nerve. Baril filed an accident report and claim for Workers allowance benefits at the time of the accident. Four long time after her accident, on July 10, 1999, Baril traveled to Tacoma, upper-case letter, for a vacation . When Baril arrived, she received a squall heart and soul indicating Hospital chattered her sister in an ride to contact Baril. In response, Baril called Hospital on its toll-free number and asked to speak to individual in her department.After a draft conversation with a coworker, Baril asked the coworker to transfer her call to her sisters home in Aiken. Baril informed her sister that she had arrived in Washington safely, and asked why Hospital requisiteed to talk to her. Barils sister offered to call Hospital to ask why it had contacted her to try to reach Baril. However, Baril declined her sisters offer. According to cry company destroys, the call lasted thirty-two seconds. No express exists in the record concerning the cost of the call or whether Hospital carry on any economic loss as a result of the call.Baril returned from vacation on July 17, 1999. When she reported to work the following day, Baril was told to meet with Arnold and Martinez de Andino. At the meetin g, Baril learned that by using Hospitals toll-free number for personal use, she profaned section 2. 2. 2 of Hospital Policy HR116, which cites dishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of amount), unofficial removal of hospital property, as critical offenses justifying immediate termination. Baril offered to pay for the telephone call, notwithstanding Arnold refused to accept payment and informed her she was being terminated.Baril exited the premises a short time thereafter. Baril filed this cause of action averring (1) Hospital created a contract of employment between Baril and itself through its written employee handbook, its amendments to the handbook, and its conduct regarding the handbooks policies, particularly the mandatory language of the disciplinary procedure in HR116 and verbal assurances provided by Lowe during the January 1999 meeting (2) Hospital breached the contract between Baril and itself by wrongfully terminating her and (3) Hospital break S.C. Code Ann. 41-1-80 (S upp. 2001) by terminating Baril in requital for filing a Workers Compensation claim. Baril sought $403,508 in actual return, plus be and other just and proper relief. Hospital answered, generally denying Barils allegations and claiming it acted in smashing assurance when dealing with Barils discipline and termination.Hospital particularally asserted that Baril was an at-will employee passim her employment with Hospital, and denied the existence of an employment contract. Hospital further claimed that, even if any employment contract existed, Hospital never breached it and that Barils discharge was not wrongful. Hospital cited Barils own conduct as the source of any and all of the employment actions that Hospital took against Baril. Additionally, Hospital maintained that Baril failed to meet Hospitals established work standards, stole Hospitals time and possibly coin when making an impermissible telephone call, and violated at least one of Hospitals specific written Company p olicies for which Hospitals action was a stated remedy of the violation. Finally, Hospital contended Baril failed to extenuate any damages she might nurture continue. Hospital moved for summary judging, leaning no material issues of feature existed and Hospital was en calld to judgment as a matter of law.The rotary Court conducted a hearing on the motion and issued an order finding (1) Hospitals policies did not constitute an implied employment contract as a matter of law, even when viewed in the faint intimately favorable to Baril (2) even if Hospitals policies make up an implied employment contract, Hospitals actions did not breach the contract because it acted pursuant to the express terms of the alleged contract and because Barils exposition of the alleged contract was strained and immoderate and would have led to absurd consequences (3) Hospital did not breach any alleged contract because on the date Hospital terminated Baril it had a reasonable, serious faith bel ief that, pursuant to the language of HR 116, it had sufficient and just cause to terminate Barils employment (4) Baril failed to establish a retaliation claim because she based this cause of action merely upon her own self-serving, unsupported opinions and the blase proximity between the filing of her workers stipend claim and her termination of employment and (5) Baril failed to moderate her damages because she did nothing to seek employment or mitigate damages in any way. The lap covering Court pink-slipped all of Barils claims with prejudice. STANDARD OF reassessment When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under come up 56(c), SCRCP summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material particular and the travel party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S. C. 488, 567 S. E. 2d 857 (2002) Ferguson v. dance Lincoln Mercury, Inc. , 349 S. C. 558, 564 S. E. 2d 94 (2002).In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the inference and all inferences which peck more or less be drawn therefrom moldiness be viewed in the clean-cut to the highest degree favorable to the stock-still party. Faile v. South Carolina Dept of Juvenile Justice, 350 S. C. 315, 566 S. E. 2d 536 (2002) McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S. C. 332, 499 S. E. 2d 488 (Ct. App. 1998). If triable issues exist, those issues essential go to the jury. Young v. South Carolina Dept of Corrections, 333 S. C. 714, 511 S. E. 2d 413 (Ct. App. 1999). Summary judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Vermeer Carolinas, Inc. v. woods/Chuck Chipper Corp. , 336 S. C. 53, 518 S. E. 2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999). every ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising from the evidence must be construed close strongly against the moving party. Bayle v. South Carolina Dept of Transp. , 344 S. C. 115, 542 S. E. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 2001). Even when there is no dispute as to evidentiary facts, and only as to the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from them, summary judgment should be denied. Hall v. Fedor, 349 S. C. 169, 561 S. E. 2d 654 (Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be cautiously invoked so no person will be improperly divest of a trial of the disputed literal issues. Lanham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 349 S. C. 356, 563 S. E.2d 331 (2002) Trivelas v. South Carolina Dept of Transp. , 348 S. C. 125, 558 S. E. 2d 271 (Ct. App. 2001). ISSUES I. Did the Circuit Court err in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Hospitals written policies and actual practices created an employment contract between the parties? II. Did the Circuit Court err in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Hospitals actions in terminating Barils employment breached a contract between the parties? III. Did the C ircuit Court err in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Baril acted reasonably in attempting to mitigate her damages? LAW/ digest I. Existence of Employment ContractBaril maintains the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril as the nonmoving party, material issues of fact exist concerning whether Hospitals written policies and actual practices created an employment contract between Baril and Hospital. We agree. South Carolina recognizes the tenet of employment at-will. Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop. , Inc. , 335 S. C. 330, 516 S. E. 2d 923 (1999). This doctrine provides that a contract for permanent employment is impermanent at the pleasure of either party when unsupported by any precondition other than the employers duty to provide compensation in exchange for the employees duty to perform a service or obligation. Id. At-will employment is generally impermanent by either party at any time, for any reason or no reason at all. Prescott, 335 S. C. at 334, 516 S. E. 2d at 925.However, an employer and employee may contr rattling alter the general rule of employment at-will, thereby restricting the freedom of either party to terminate the employment relationship without producering liability. See Small v. Springs Indus. , Inc. , 292 S. C. 481, 357 S. E. 2d 452 (1987). For example, an employee handbook may create a contract altering an at-will arrangement. Id. Because an employee handbook may create an employment contract, the dubiousness of whether a contract exists is for a jury when its existence is questioned and the evidence is either conflicting or admits of more than one inference. Conner v. City of woods Acres, 348 S. C. 454, 560 S. E. 2d 606 (2002) (stating summary judgment is impertinent in most instances when handbook contains both a disclaimer and promises).The presence of promissory language and a disclaimer in the handbook make it ambiguous and subject to more than one interpretation. 3 See Fleming v. Borden, 316 S. C. 452, 450 S. E. 2d 589 (1994) (stating that a handbook containing both a disclaimer and promissory language should be viewed as inherently ambiguous). Here, the handbook states that it does not operate to change the at-will nature of employment to a contractual relationship. However, the handbooks procedures concerning progressive discipline, discharge, and grievance are couched in mandatory terms, including assurances that the procedures will be followed. As to Lowes statements regarding the new disciplinary policy, Baril testifiedRichard Lowe told me, guaranteed me that the new disciplinary policy was put into effect for exactly that reason because I told Richard, I said, you know, I have been a manager, and you can use a disciplinary procedure to try to eliminate people or try to help people make grow and have positive behaviors and goals and grow. And Richard Lowe said that is what that policy is for, is to help y ou, and that is what is going to be misfortune from this point forward, and I felt that that was a guarantee, was a contract, a verbal contract that I would be treated equitably, that I would bethat I would not be targeted any further, that the grievance was over, and we were to go forward. And so I felt at that time that that was a contract that was make . . . . Thus, the court concluded that the procedures and practices established by the Hospital was more than sufficient for it to arrive at the conclusion that an employment contract was created between the parties. II.Hospitals Actions in Terminating Barils Employment Baril claims the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril as the nonmoving party, material issues of fact exist regarding whether Hospitals actions in terminating her employment breached an employment contract between Hospital and Baril. We agree. When an employment contract only permits ter mination for cause, the appropriate test on the issue of breach focuses on whether the employer had a reasonable good faith belief that sufficient cause existed for termination. Conner v. City of forest Acres, 348 S. C. 454, 464, 560 S. E.2d 606, 611 (2002) (emphasis added). The fact finder must not focus on whether the employee actually committed misconduct instead, the focus must be on whether the employer reasonably determined it had cause to terminate. Id. at 464-65, 560 S. E. 2d at 611. a. Reasonable Good Faith In the January 1999 meeting, Baril expressed concern that Martinez de Andino disliked her and would use Hospitals disciplinary process to terminate her. Lowe responded that Hospital had updated pertinent portions of its employee handbook to prevent the disciplinary procedure from being abused to eliminate employees and to ensure that it would only be used to positively impact its employees.Nevertheless, reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Hospital proceeded to act in reasonable good faith by using the disciplinary policy to immediately terminate Baril for using the toll-free line to transfer one possibly business- associate telephone call to Barils sister for thirty-two seconds. Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that summary judgment should not ordinarily be used to resolve the question of whether an employer acted under a reasonable good faith belief that sufficient cause existed for termination. Conner, 348 S. C. at 465, 560 S. E. 2d at 611-612. display the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril, we find that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Hospital acted with good faith in terminating Baril. b. Sufficient Cause Hospital alleges it followed its disciplinary policies in terminating Baril.Hospital contends Barils request that her call on Hospitals toll-free line be transferred to her sisters orphic ingleside constituted an act of dishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of amount), unauthorised removal of hosp ital property. Thus, Hospital avers Baril show violation of a critical offense meriting immediate termination. However, Hospital never announce a policy against use of its toll-free telephone line by employees for personal or private business, although the written materials of Hospital purported to communicate policies and changes to Hospital employees. Furthermore, Baril declared that other Hospital employees had engaged in identical behavior without Hospitals objection, thereby raising the possibility that Hospital tacitly condoned the practice.Assuming, arguendo, that Hospital rightfully concluded such employee use of its toll-free telephone lines for private purposes constituted dishonesty, fraud, or theft sufficient to merit immediate termination under its policy, evidence exists that Barils telephone call to her sister originated in matters related to her employment at Hospital. Moreover, Hospital failed to produce any evidence that it suffered a loss related to the telepho ne call. In addition, Hospital rejected Barils good-faith efforts to compensate Hospital for any loss it may have sustained for the thirty-two second call, although Hospitals uncontroversial practice was to permit employees to give back it for private long-distance telephone calls.The Circuit Court determined no evidence showed or even suggested that Baril ever reimbursed or attempted to reimburse Hospital for any of these calls. A cursory reading of the record contradicts this finding. First, the phrase any of these calls wrongly implies that Baril made more than one call, contrary to undisputed evidence that she only made one call at issue. Next, the record is plentiful with testimony from Baril and Lowe that Baril immediately offered to reimburse Hospital for any expenses related to the telephone call. Hospital maintains Baril abused her authority by ordering a subordinate to transfer the telephone call outside the Hospital. Yet, the record contains no evidence that Baril had any subordinates at the Hospital at the time she placed the call.In fact, the employee whom Baril asked to transfer the call was only considered a subordinate by the trial court because she had previously been one of Barils nursing students. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril, we conclude her actions constituted a mere peccadillo at worst and that reasonable minds could differ concerning whether Hospital terminated Baril with just cause. III. Mitigation of indemnity Baril claims the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril as the nonmoving party, material issues of fact exist concerning whether she made reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. We agree.A party injured by the acts of some other is required to do those things a person of ordinary prudence would do under the circumstances, but the law does not require him to exert himself unreasonably or incur substantial expense to avoid damages. McClary v. Massey Ferguson, Inc. , 291 S. C. 506, 354 S. E. 2d 405 (Ct. App. 1987). Whether the party acted reasonably to mitigate damages is ordinarily a question for the jury. Id. Baril did not seek other employment end-to-end this litigation. However, she attempted to justify her behavior. First, she testified she did not want to reveal to potential employers that she had been fired. Second, she testified that there were no other hospitals with emergency rooms in or near Aiken, where she resided. Thus, she would have been forced to either transfigure or move in order to perform mistakable work.Baril did not want to relocate because she had a home and family in Aiken, where she taught college classes on a full-time basis. Baril speculated that a lengthy commute would interfere with her teaching career. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril, reasonable minds could disagree over whether she made reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. T he trial court should have allowed this question to be resolved by a jury. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the trial courts decision is REVERSED and REMANDED. CONNOR and STILWELL, JJ. , concur. 1 John Arnolds specific job title is unclear in the record, which indicates he operated in a supervisory capacity similar to that of Martinez de Andino.2 Shortly before Martinez de Andino initiated the July 1998 disciplinary action against Baril, a dispute arose between them concerning Martinez de Andinos decision to hire paramedics to perform nursing functions in the emergency room. Baril learned from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental arrest that South Carolina law prohibited paramedics from performing some of the functions that Martinez de Andino intended for them to perform. Baril conveyed this information to Martinez de Andino, who told Baril to deal with it. Baril contends Martinez de Andino resented Barils input, leading to a turn of their relationship that motivated her to seek Barils termination. 3 Baril and Hospital clearly disagree about the existence of a contract.